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Yehenew
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The Nile Basin: From Confrontation
to Cooperation

Water is one of the scarcest natural resources on our planet. Yet, it is one of
humans' most vital needs This gift of nature has been a cause of tension and
confrontation in many parts of the world due to the lack of a shared vision for its
optimal and rational use Among the great water bodies, the Nile basin has
been cited as one of the major trouble spots Recently, the Nile basin states
have started to cooperate under the auspices of the Nile Basin Initiative for
sustainable and equitable approach to Nile water use. This article discusses
some of the recent cooperative efforts in the use, management and development
of the Nile. It briefly discusses the natural setting of the Nile River and reviews
past confrontations over Nile waters. It then tries to highlight some of the reasons
why basin-wide cooperation is necessary for the riparian states. The final section
of the article outlines the need for a permanent legal and institutional framework
that would help ensure the optimal and equitable utilization of Nile waters.
L'eau est Iune des ressources naturelles les plus lmites de /a plan~te. Pourtant,
elle est l'un des elements les plus essentiels aux humains. Ce cadeau de la
nature est une source de tension et de confrontation dans beaucoup de parties
du monde 6 cause de I'absence d'une vision commune pour son utilisation
optimale et rationnelle. Le bassin du Nil est l'un des grands bassins
hydrographiques souvent cite comme lun des principaux -points chauds,.
Recemment, les dtats limitrophes du bassin du Nil ont amorc6 une collaboration
sous les auspices de I Initiative du bassin du Nil en vue d'adopter une approche
durable et 6quitable quant J Iutilisationde l'eau du Nil. Cet article d~crit certains
des recents efforts de collaboration pour ce qui est de lutilisation, de Ia gestion
et du developpement du Nil. L'auteur d~crit bri6vement le cours et
Ienvironnement du Nil et il rappelle les conflits pass6s relativement i ses eaux.
II 6nonce ensuite certains des motifs qui rendent n6cessaire la collaboration
entre les Etats riverains. Lauteur fait ensuite ressortir le besoin d'un cadre
Igislatifet institutionnel permanent qui permettrait d'assurer Iutilisation optimale
et uquitable des eaux du Nil
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Introduction
"Perhaps the weight of history lies too heavy in the silt of the Nile valley,
but man will always need water; and in the end this may drive him to the
river to drink with his enemies."'
"One day, every last drop of water which drains into the whole valley of
the Nile ... shall be equally and amicably divided among the river people,
and the Nile itself... shall perish gloriously and never reach the sea."'
Water is one of the scarcest natural resources on our planet. Yet, it is one of
humanity's most vital needs and everyone "...including the poor and
marginalized, must have access...."' This gift of nature "...which has no
substitute, which has poorly developed international law, and the need for
which is overwhelming, constant, and immediate has driven its share of

I. Robert 0 Collins, The t1'aerv of the Nile - Hvdropolitics and the Jonglei Canal 1898-1988
(Oxford Clarendon Press, 1990) at 300 quoted in Lisa M. Jacobs, "Sharing the Gifts of the Nile:
Establishment of a Legal Regime for Nile Waters Management" (1993) 7:1 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.
J. 95 at 122 [Jacobs: Sharing the Gifts of the Nile].
2.
Winston Churchill, (1908) quoted in Lori Pottinger, "Can the Nile States Dam Their Way to
Cooperation" (March 20t)4) online: International Rivers Network <http://www.irn.org/ programs/
safrca NileBriefing.pdf> (Lori Pottinger: The Nile States] (date accessed: September 4, 2004).
3.
World Commission on Water for the Twenty-First Century, Commission Report: Water Secure
World: Vision for Water, Life, and the Environment quoted in James Kraska, "Sustainable Development is Security: The Role of Transboundary River Agreement as a Confidence Building Measure
(CBM) in South Asia" (2003) 28 Yale J. Int'l Law 46,5 at 466, n. 4.
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political conflicts."' Regrettably, this essential resource has been a cause
of tension and confrontation in many parts of the world due to the lack of
a shared vision for its optimal and rational use.' There is no shortage of
predictions forecasting the possibility of water wars in the foreseeable
future.6 Among these water bodies, the legendary Nile River, "a prime
example of a scarce water resource",' has engendered constant tension
among the riparian states and has been a textbook example of a cause for
international conflict!
4.
Jesse H. Hamner & Aaron T. \%olf. "'Patterns in International Water Resource Treaties: The
Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database" (1997) 1997 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. Y.B. 157.
5,
The confrontations in the Jordan Valley and the conflict between India and Pakistan over the
Indus Valley are good examples.
6,
Among the many prophecies, it suffices to quote the following: "...in a geopolitical sense,
water is likely to become the oil of the next century" See Arun P Elhance, Hydropolitics in the Third
Rbrld: Conflict and Cooperation in International River Basins, (Washington D.C.: United States
Institute of Peace Press, 1999) at 54 The World Bank's Vice President, lsmael Seageldin, once said
"many wars this century were about oil. but the wars of the next century will be about water" quoted
in the Mal & Guardian, 20 December 1999. Thomas Naffalleges that "[i]n sum, the strategic reality
of water is that under the circumstances of scarctN. it becomes a highly symbolic, contagious, aggregated, intense, salient, complicated, zero-sum. power-and-prestige-packed issue, highly prone to
conflict and extremely difficult to resolve." See Thomas Naff, "Water Scarcity, Resource Management, and Conflict in the Middle East" in Elizabeth Kirk, ed., Environmental Dimensions of Securif. : Proceedings from .4.4S Annual ilceting Symposium, (Washington: American Association for
the Advancement of Science, 1992) at 25. According to Klaus Toepfer, Director-General of the UNEP,
"Future war over water is a real possibilitN" "Water 'Aars Forecast if Solutions Not Found", online:
<http:/ ens.lycos. com ensjan99i 19991-01-01-02.html> (date accessed: March 6. 2002). In the opinion of the UNESCO's Director-General, Federico Mayor "as [water] becomes increasingly rare, it
becomes coveted, capable of unleashing conflicts More than petrol or land, it is over water that the
bitterest conflicts of the near future may be fought." Ibid., see generally, Gred Browder & Leonard
Ortolano, "The Evolution of an International Water Resources Management Regime in the Mekong
River Basin" (2000) 40:3 Nat. Resources J. 499 at 500; Patncia Wouters, "An Assessment of Recent
Development in International Watercourses Law through the Prism of the Substantive Rules Governing Use Allocation" (1996) 36 Nat. Resources J. 417. But Dellapenna says, "Water is simply too
critical a resource to fight over." See Joseph W. Dellapenna, "Treaties as Instruments for Managing
Internationally Shared Water Resources. Restricted Sovereignty vs. Community of Property" (1994)
26:1 Case W. Res J. Int'l L. 27 at 31 [Dellapenna Treaties as Instruments].
7. Niveen Tadros, "Shrinking Water Resources The National Security Issue of this Century" (1997)
17:2 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 1092 [Tadros: Shrinking Water Resources].
8. John Barnett, "Destabilizing the Enironment" (2000) 26:2 Review of International Studies
271 at 275; Russell Smith, BBC Neus Online "Africa's potential water wars," online: BBC News
<http://news.bbc. co.uk/hi/english/worldLafnca/454926.stm> (date accessed: 11 July 2001). Smith
argues that the Nile is one of the "possible flash points"; Ashok Swain, "Ethiopia, the Sudan, and
Egypt: The Nile River Dispute" (1997) 35:4 The Journal ofModern African Studies 693 [Swain: The
Nile River Dispute]. Swain says that unless the states are able to bring the current competitive use to
a halt the disagreement may well 'escalate into violence over sharing the resources of the Nile in the
near future'; Daniel Kendie, "Egypt and the Hydro-politics of the Blue Nile River" The Reporter
(August 6, 1999) at 10 [Daniel: Hydro-politics of the Blue Nile]; "Interview with Ambassador David
Shinn" (August 6, 2000) with Addis Tribune at A9. Tadros: Shrinking Water Resources. supra note
7 at 1091; Dante A. Caponera, "Legal Aspects ofTrans Boundary Rivers Basins in the Middle East
The Al Asi (Orontes), The Jordan and the Nile" (1993) 33 Nat. Resources J.at 629 [Caponera: Legal
Aspects]; Peter Allison, "International Water Hot Spots : A Dozen Flash Points Where Past and
Present Disputes over Water could Lead to Full-scale Armed Conflicts," online: ITT Industries <http:/
/www.ittind.com/waterbook/ intl-hot-spots.asp> (date accessed: July 23, 2001).
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The Nile has been flowing through Sub-Saharan Africa for centuries
without making any significant contribution to the development of the
region, with the exception of Egypt.' Several factors account for this
regrettable situation including: the unbalanced economic and political
capacity of the riparian states: recurrent famine throughout the riparian
area: political instability in the region: and financial, institutional, technical and human resources constraints."' Consequently, there has been much
pessimism surrounding the issue of a shared vision on the reasonable use
and sustainable management of the Nile. As one commentator has noted:
Decreasing \ater volume's, increasing water demand and a decidedly
lopsided distribution of \\ater. with one country [Egypt] benefiting more
than all the others combined. To the casual observer, this cursory
assessment of the situation in the Nile Basin would spell an unusually
large potential for conflict.''
In light of this insightful observation, a recent change of heart which manifested itself as an apparent willingness on the part of Egypt to cooperate
with the rest of the Nile basin countries, has come as a pleasant surprise to
obser\ ers of the hydro-politics of the Nile. Egypt has demonstrated a shift
from its assumed gate-keeping role to acknowledging the rights of other
riparian states to share the resources of the Nile. Thus, Robert Collins's
prophetic words quoted at the beginning of this article may yet come true.
The Nile basin states, including Egypt, have started to cooperate under the
auspices of the Nile Basin Initiative for a sustainable and equitable
approach to Nile vater use.
This article analyzes some of the recent developments regarding this
cooperative effort to manage the Nile. It briefly discusses the natural

For the geographical description of the Nile basin see Part I The ten Nile basin states are
Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia. Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan. Tanzania, and Uganda.
10. J. Anthon\ Allan. "The Nile Basin: Evolving Approaches to the Nile Wiaters Management"
(1990) 2) Ocasional Papers online: SOAS <http: /ws soas.ac.uklGeographyj\\aterlssues /
OccasionalPapers AcrobatFiles/OCC20.PDF> (date accessed JuI, 13. 2001) [Allan: Eoling Approaches]; Kinfe Abraham, "The Nile Issue: Pscho-Pohtical Hurdles to an Agreement, The Basis
at 43 [Kinfe: The Nile Isand Contestabilt, of Previous Accord',' (Noember 1999) 3:2 (I.,,'a
sue]: Jacob,: Sharing the Gifts of the Nile, supra note I at 118. According to Caponera the interest
of the other upper riparians, such as Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, U ganda, and Zaire "mainly
concern power production and control of floods." Caponera: Legal Aspects. supra note 8 at 662.
Salim and Amoako stated that out of the ten Nile countries "se',en countries are, or recently have
been, insoled in international or internal conflict." 'ee S.A. Salim & K.Y. Amoako, "If the Nile
Can Dissolve Borders" Iniernational Herald Tribune( 13 July 2001 ) [Salim and Amoako: If the Nile
(an t)is,ole Borders].
II
B. Pothumus, "Nile Basin Nations Move Towards Cooperation," online: Oneworld <http://
www.ss
one\sorld org'euconflict/publicatnl3 I /pagel3.html> (date accessed: August 26, 2001).
9)
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setting of the Nile River and reviews past confrontations over Nile waters.
It then seeks to explain some of the reasons why basin-wide cooperation is
necessary for the riparian states. The final section of the article outlines
the need for a permanent legal and institutional framework that would help
ensure the optimal and equitable utilization of Nile waters.

1. Natural Setting
The Nile River is located in the northeastern part of Africa. It is the longest
river in the world, traversing 6,825 kilometers and traveling through ten
African States.' " Its main sources are the Blue Nile, which rises in the
Ethiopian highlands, and the White Nile which originates in Lake Victoria
in east central Africa.13 The White Nile and the Blue Nile flow to Khartoum,
where they join and flow on to Egypt, eventually emptying into the Mediterranean Sea.' 4 Other sources of the Nile include the Kagera and Arbarah
rivers and Lake Albert.' 5 Nearly 860o of the Nile's water originates in the
Ethiopian highlands, while the remaining 1400 comes from the White Nile.' 6
In its long journey, the Nile "'...takes decomposed basalt, rich
alluvial soil and silts and converts what would otherwise have been a
complete desert into a rich agricultural area.""
The Nile has been providing life to the surrounding basin since time
immemorial. Despite the abundant natural endowments in this region, the
basin has five of the ten poorest nations of the world all with annual per
capita income of less than S200.' The inhabitants of the basin are faced
with extreme poverty, instability, rapid population growth and environmental degradation and many are reduced to begging or leading a hand-tomouth existence at best. The population of the region, which was 300
million in the year 2000, is growing at a 3% annual rate.' "

12. Nile Basin Initiative, "Introduction to the Nile River Basin," online: Nile Basin Initiative <http:/
/www.nilebasin.orgilntroNR.htm> [NIB: Introduction] (date accessed: July 26, 2001).
13. Tadros: Shrinking Water Resources, supra note 7 at 1094.
14
15.

Ibid.
NIB: Introduction, supra note 12.

16. Jacobs: Sharing the Gifts of the Nile, supra note I at 96; C.O. Okidi, "Legal and Policy Regime
of Lake Victoria and Nile Basins," (1980) 20 Indian J. Int'l L. 398-399 [Okidi: Legal and Policy
Regime], C.O. Okidi, "Review of Treaties on Consumptive Utilization of Waters of Lake Victoria
and Nile Drainage System" (1981) 22 Nat. Resources J. 161 [Okidi: Review of Treaties].
17. Daniel: Hydro-politics of the Blue Nile, supra note 8, see also Dellapenna: Treaties as Instruments, supra note 6 at 47; Caponera: Legal Aspects, supra note 8 at 650.
18. Salim and Amoako: If the Nile Can Dissolve Borders, supra note 10. The basin is rich in,
among others, natural gas, oil, gold, cobalt, diamond.
19. World Bank, "Nile Basin: Overview," online: The World Bank Group <http://www.
worldbank.org/afr/nilebasin/> (date accessed: August 4, 2001).
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All these factors suggest that the Nile river has the potential to play a
significant role in extricating the Nile inhabitants from poverty and helping them to attain food sufficiency, economic development and regional
economic integration. In order to achieve these lofty goals and to meet the
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needs of present and future generations, the Nile needs to be managed,
protected and conserved.

II. Past Confrontations
A distinctive feature of the Nile River has been the lack of a shared vision
and spirit of cooperation among the riparian states. Thus, there is no basinwide agreement that takes into account the interests of all ten states
sharing the Nile. A few agreements, however, do exist."0 These treaties
were mainly designed to protect the interests of Egypt and its former
colonizer Great Britain and, to a certain extent, the Sudan.2 For instance,
in the 1929 agreement between Great Britain and the Egyptian government, the former recognized Egypt's "historical" and "natural" rights to

20. There are at least 14 Agreements. Treaties. Memoranda of Understanding and Exchange of
Notes. For the complete list of these instruments see Caponera: Legal Aspects, supra note 8 at 657659. For detailed discussion of the Nile treaties see Christina M. Carroll, "Past and Future Legal
Framework of the Nile River Basin" (1999) 12:1 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L.Rev. 269 at 276-281 [Carroll:
Past and Future]: Swain: The Nile River Dispute. supra note 8 at 675-683; Kefyalew Mekonnen,
"The Defects and Effects of Past Treaties and Agreements on the Nile River Waters: Whose Faults
Were They?" Addis Tribune (28 Noember 1998). also available online Ethiopians <http://
ww-w.Ethiopians.com abayiengn.html> (date accessed: August 22, 2001); C.O. Okidi: Review of
Treaties, supra note 16 at 166-196; C.O. Okidi: Legal and Policy Regime, supra note 16, at 410-436;
Fisseha Yimer, "State Succession and the Legal Status of International Rivers" in Ralph Zacklin &
Lucius Caflisch, eds., The Legal Regime Of InternationalRiver%and Lakes (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 1981) 177 at 186-190 [Fisseha: The Legal Regime]; Albert H. Garretson, "The
Nile Basin" in A.H. Garretson, R.D. Hayton & CJ. Olmstead, eds., The Law ofInternational Drainage Basins (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1967) 256 at 270-292 [Garretson: The Nile Basin]; Mekete Bekele Tekle. "Sharing the Nile Waters: A Quest for Equity Among the Riparian States"
(1998) 7:8 Njiwa, Magazine of the Eastern Africa Environmental Network at 6-7 [Mekete: Sharing
Nile Waters]; Getachew Aberra, "There is Neither Customary International Law nor a Treaty that
Entitles Egypt to Nile Waters within Ethiopian Territory" The Reporter(24 November 1999) at 6 &
10 [Getachew: Customary International Law]; Rolet Chih-Shih Chen, The Non-navigational Uses of
International Rivers (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, 1963) at 31 & 46-54
[unpublished] [Chen: International Rivers]; Sayed Mohamed Hosni, Legal Problems of The Development of The River Nile (Ph.D. Dissertation, Ne%% York University, 1957) at 75-222 [unpublished];
Jacobs: Shanng the Gifts of the Nile, supra note I at 105-114; Bonaya Adhi Godana, Africa s
Shared Water Resources: Legal and InstitutionalAspects of the Nile, Niger and Senegal River Systems (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), at 103-123 [Godana: Africa's Shared Waters]. It is possible to
divide these treaties into three types: a) Colonial agreements signed between colonial powers during
their rule in the basin outside of Ethiopia; b) agreements concluded between colonial powers and
independent states into states; and c) agreements entered between independent countries of the basin. The first set of agreements favoured the colonial interest in Egypt and the Sudan. The second
type of agreements, notably the 1929 agreement, provided that Egypt has a monopolistic right over
the Nile waters. In this agreement Great Britain went to the extent of recognizing the "natural" or
"historical" right of Egypt on the river. The third category of agreements, notably the 1959 agreement, partitioned the Nile waters between Egypt and the Sudan and denied the rights of the other
riparian countries.
21. Carroll: Past and Future, supra note 20 at 278; Caponera: Legal Aspects, supra note 8 at 657
and 662.
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23
the Nile. These treaties do not include most of the riparian states. The
I 05) treaty between I' gypt and the Sudan, an ,r,,mcn il r i/ic Full
Utilizanmi ol it, Vile Rive,'r is a good illustration.24 As the title of the
\greement indicates, these t\\o countries set out to utilize all of the water
of the Nile.> Thus, ig\'pt and Sudan apportioned almost the entire water
tlo\\ of the Nile between themselxcs, 55.5 billion cubic meters a year for
Egy pt and 1,.5 billion cubic meters a year for the Sudan, respectively.2
Gamal \loursi Badr, an Egyptian writer, argues that the main reason
N\h the Nile \\ater question has constituted an exclusive bilateral issue
between I gypt and the Sudan is because "None of [the remaining]

countries has an'lrwescnt, ur indeed/orc. t'hle, use of the Nile waters for

irrigation purposes."' - His argument is unpersuasi\e for the simple reason
that no one could rule out the possible plans of the other riparians to use
the Nile for different activities, including large irrigation schemes. This
lack of shared \ ision and meaningful cooperation for an optimal utilization of the river creates the potential for serious confrontations and
disagreements o\ er the Nile \\ ater.
Be\ ond e\cluding man\ of the riparians. these agreements also leave
out issues that are at the forefront of contemporary international water
sharing and management thinking such as environmental protection and
sustainable de\elopment of the rixer.:" Norco cr. due to socio-economic
and political changes that have been taking shape in the region since the
1960's. the status of the treaties is highly controversial. Following the
independence of some of the riparian states in the 1960's, several of them
hake rejected the colonial agreements, based on the doctrine of tabula rasa
(the clean slate doctrine), the principle of clausula rebus sic stantibus or

22.
23
4

Carroll Pat and Future, sipra note 20 at278
Svam: The Nile River lIpute, ,'ip, note 8 at6,,h
I, rt'vmtent
on the Full t 'ilization )i/ the \'i/c Ilaieri. (8 Nos ember 1'959).

27.

Gamal Moursi Badr. "The Nile Waters Question: Background and Recent Deelopment" (1960)

.A.E.-Sudan, 43
L N I S 1,reprinted I SQi 15 Re\. E.D.I. 321 [.iireernent on tht \ie].
25
Okidi argues that it seems rather anomalous to refer to that agreement a, "full utilization" and
"full control ofthe river" when there \Nerconly tNo countries insolsed in the agreement rather than
all the riparian stalcs ( ikidi: Re\ic\ of Treaties. supra note 16 at 1S2: Okidi: Legal and Policy
note 16 at 421.
Regime, siupra
note 24, Art. 2.
IL,
eeni'nt on the Vilc,
% ipra
26
15 Rev E. 1 94 at 95 [emphasis added].
2× Carroll: ['aiand Future, .upra note 20 at 282. Getache,: .'utomar\ International Law. siepra
note 20 at I10,
ladros Shrinking \\atci Resources. supra note 7 at 1196
29. Sce ( arroll: Pai and Futurc, supro note 20 at 278-282, Fisseha: The Legal Regime, supra note
2)0 at 260, Gctachew Customary International Law, supra note 20 at 10: Caponera: Legal Aspects,
sipra note X at 66))-(i62. -adros: Shrinking Water Re',ourccs, uiptra note 7 at I006. Godana: Africa's
Shared \'iaicrs. %upranote 2)) at 143-157.
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the Nyerere doctrine.
According to the doctrine of tabula rasa, successor states do not
inherit obligations arising out of treaties concluded by their predecessors.3"
Hence, "...a newly independent state begins its life with a clean slate [with

respect to treaties concluded by its predecessor].'"i As far as the treaties
that were concluded at the dawn of the 20th century, riparian states may
invoke the principle of clausula rebus sic stantibus: fundamental change

of circumstances."' Gi en the socio-economic and demographic changes
that have taken place in the basin, Nile states can invoke Article 62 of the
1969 VTenna Convention on the Law of Treaties which stipulates that

fundamental change of circumstances can be invoked to terminate an
existing international treaty."5 The Nyerere doctrine, named after the late
Tanzanian President M.J.M. Nyerere, states that treaties concluded by
former colonies of Great Britain lapsed when they became independent. "
Egypt, however, has stood alone in arguing that the treaties remain
binding on the successor state. 5 Riparian states that are not party to the
existing Nile agreements could also invoke the principle of pact tertiisnec
nocent nec prosunt3' to challenge such agreements. To put it differently,
the parties to those treaties can create rights and duties only to themselves,
not to non-state parties.
Another distinctive feature of Nile hydro-politics is the inverse
relation of the state's water contribution to the full volume of the Nile and
the state's dependency and utilization on, and of, Nile waters. Put simply,
Ethiopia, the country from which 86% of the waters of the Nile originates,
makes insignificant use of the river- while countries such as Egypt and

30.

Godana: Africa's Shared Waters. supra note 20 at 137.

31.
32.

Fisseha: The Legal Regime, supra note 20 at 179.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679

(entered into force 27 January 1980) [tienna Convention].
33. Getachew: Customary International Law, supra note 20 at 10.
34- Carroll: Past and Future, supra note 20 at 279.
35 Godana: Africa's Shared Waters, supra note 20 at 143-144.
36. It means contracts create obligations and confer rights only on contracting parties. See Christine Chinkin, Third Parties in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) at 5; Sir Ian Sinclair,
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984) at
98-99. Articles 34-36 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties also address this issue, Vienna
Convention, supra note 32.

37. According to a well-known Nile researcher, Ethiopia's annual use of the Nile is "less than I
See Tesfaye Tafesse, The Nile Question:
percent of the Nile, i.e. 0.65 billion m' of water ....
Hydropolitics, Legal Wrangling, Modus Vivendi and Perspectives (London: Transaction Publishers,

2001) at 44 [Tesfaye: The Nile Question]; see also Lori Pottinger: The Nile States, supra note 2.
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tile Sudan, that contribute little or nothing

"

to the overall volume of the
Nile, extract the largest share of the Nile waters. As acknowledged by a
former Egyptian Ambassador to Ethiopia, Marawan Badr, Egypt "depends
on the Nile for 97oo of [its] waters"39 and Sudan, next to Egypt, makes
significant use of Nile waters.
Egypt and Sudan have consistently acted as if the Nile originates in
Sudan and ends in Egypt. These two countries have been unwilling to share
the Nile's resources with Ethiopia, the single largest contributor to the
Nile. Ethiopia, a country that has been preoccupied with maintaining its
territorial integrity and political independence and hard hit by recurrent
drought and famine, 4" has had little time and scarce resources to develop
and use its natural bounty, the Nile.
Relations among the riparian states, especially between Egypt and Ethiopia, have been strained and marred by mistrust and suspicion. In the near
past, acrimonious statements flew back and forth between Addis Ababa
and Cairo concerning the use of the Nile. The two countries accused each
other of appropriating or monopolizing the Nile unilaterally. Ethiopia's
call for a change to the status quo, for a fair and reasonable use of the Nile,
has been labeled as disingenuous, and has earned it several threats of war.
For instance in 1979, Anwar Sadat, then President of Egypt, stated that
"...the only matter that could take Egypt to war again [after the 1974 War
x ith Israel] is water."' Echoing this view, Boutros Boutros Ghali asserted
in 1990 that "[t]he next war in our region will be over water of the Nile,
not politics."4 2 In a similar vein, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt was
quoted as late as 1999 as threatening to bomb Ethiopia if the latter planned

1, Sch% abach contends that Lgy pt contributes nothing to% ards Nle %
ater. See Aaron Schwabach,
"The Loited Nations Con ention on the Law of Non-na%igational L ses of International Watercourses,
Customary International La\%, and the Interest of DeN eloping Upper Riparians" (1998) 33 Tex. Int'l
L. J. 257 at 26,3 1Schwabach: The United Nations Convention]. He sass "None of the river's water
originates v, ithin Lgs pt. with the exception of a small amount of rain. Egypt is entirely dependent on
its upstream neighbors for its supply of water....'% see also Godana: Africa's Shared Water Resources, supru note 20 at 83 and Carroll: Past and Future, supra note 20 at 275.
39. Ambassador Marawan Badr, "Egypt and the Horn of Africa: The True Perspectise" Addis Tribune (7 August 191t) at A3.
40
Daniel: tldro-politics of the Blue Nile, supra note 8 (13 August 1999) at 1I.

41. 0. (,enckaya. "Interdependence, Cooperation and Conflict Resolution: A Critical Assessment
of Peace-Pipeline Project" (Address before the First Conference of the European Peace Research
Association. Florence, Italy 8-10 November 1991) quoted in Caponera: Legal Aspects, supra note 8
at 630. Dellapenna considers such war threats as far-fetched for the too countries do not share a
common border. Dellapenna: Riscrs as Instruments, supra note 6 at 27.
42 Gebre Isadik Degefu, "What Benefits Will Ethopia Gain from Membership of the Nile Basin
Initiative?" Addis Tribune( 18 February 2002), online: AddisTribune <http:/, v,v.addistribune. com!
Archives/2005 12 18-02-05 What.htm> (date accessed: June 3, 2005).
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development \vorks on the Nile.4 3
Naturally, these threats of \\ar did not sit well with the Ethiopian
Tgovernment. The Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Seyoum Mesfin, for example,
responded by stating that Egypt's continuous threat of war was an
irresponsible instance of jingoism that will not get us [riparian states]
anywhere near the solution of the problem."' " He added: "there is no earthly
force that can stop Ethiopia from benefiting from the Nile."'4s
Moreover, several commentators have maintained that Egypt has been
providing material and logistical support to insurrectionist groups who have
\orked towards destabilizing Ethiopia. One observer claims that Egypt
"...wvent to the extent of sponsoring disgruntled political groupings such
as the Somali factions and the Eritrean government as a form of deterrence
and probably as political intimidation directed against Ethiopia."" Another
researcher noted that -[b]y promoting the Eritrean insurrection, Egypt made
sure that Ethiopia would not divert both its efforts and its resources into
quelling the Eritrean uprising - resources, which could have been
4'
utilized in tapping the water of the Blue Nile for development purposes."
Similarly, it has been claimed that Egypt, whose nationals were heads
of "...crucial departments concerned with environment and international
law [in the World Bank in the 1980s and 1990s],"4 has never been hesitant
to use its political leverage and influence to block financial assistance and
loans from donor and international financial institutions intended to
undertake development works on the Blue Nile. For instance, Egypt
successfully blocked a loan from the African Development Bank to Ethiopia in 1990 for water development projects."
Interestingly and paradoxically, Egypt has undertaken two of the
largest irrigation projects in Africa, the Toshkan and El Salaam (Peace)

41

"Africa's Potential Water Wars," BBC \ei,

news.bbc.co.ukl

(II October 1999), online: BBC News <http://

hi,
english! world africa 454926 stm> (date accessed: February 3, 20101 ).BBC re-

tracted this nevs on the request of the Egyptian Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, see "Egypt

Embassy denies Reports of Mubarak Threatening to attack Ethiopia-BBC Apologizes to Egyptian
Embassy" The Reporter (January 12, 2000) at 3.
44 Statement by Ethiopian Foreign linister Seyoum Mesfin, 'Egptis Diverting the Nile through
the T[o]shkan and Peace Canal Projects" .4ddt, Tribune (30 January 1998) [Scyoum: Egypt is Diverting the Nile].
45

Ibid

46. Alula Yohannes, "The Politics of Nile" (Presented to East African Forum) online: [Ethiopiafirst]
<http:.www .ethiopiafirst.connews/ness459 html> (date accessed: July 13, 2001).
47. Daniel: Hydro-politics of the Blue Nile, supra note 8 (13 August 1999) at II.
48. Allan: Evolving Approaches, supra note 10.
49- Swain: The Nile River Dispute, supra note 8 at 688. Joseph "' Dellapenna, "Rivers as Legal
Structures: The Example of the Jordan and the Nile" (1996) 36 Nat. Resourccs J 217 at 247

[Dellapenna: Rivers as Legal Structures].
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Canals, \\ ithout cver consulting any of the other riparian states. Some of
these projects, notably the El Salaam Canal, are intended to divert water
from its natural course into the Sinai Desert in order to transform it into
producti\e and habitable agricultural and industrial areas." ' This project
plans to divert six million gallons of water per day in order to irrigate over
5ll,00
0lll
acres of land in one of the world's driest climates." This enterprise, \\hich has been called the "project of the millennium" by President
Mubarak,'52 has attracted much international attention and debate. One
scholar dubbed the project as "preposterous, a national fantasy"53 and
another calls it an attempt to "clone a NIc."' Similar criticisms came even
from Egyptian scholars and xxater experts. Farouk EI-Baz, an Egyptian
h\drologisl, doubted the \ ability and long-term effects of the project."5
He claimed that ... the open channel \\ill sufler enormous evaporative
lo.s, and could easily be filled xxith sand blowing from the area's large
dunes.""- Microbiological studies indicated that the "large volume of
stagnant xxater in the canals under the hot desert sun xwill facilitate the
breeding of cxen more snails carr\ ing the killer schistosomiasis
bloodflunkes (bilharzia) and lead to an increase of mosquitoes."- 7 Despite
such criticisms, President Mubarak appears determined to go ahead with
the project."
To justify and perpetuate its monopolistic use of the Nile waters and
the myth that Egypt aut.\l. is aut nihil," Egypt has consistently championed the 'no harm rule' "in its stronger, more absolute x ersion ......
over the
Nile.' The essence of this claim is that since Egypt's use of the Nile has

10 Sesoum: Egypt is DiNerting the Nile, mula note 44
51
\aron (iladman. "\,t,,i\c Nile Riscr Diversion, Planned- 11997) 12:3 Ilbrd River, Reiici.
online International Risers Ncl\rk http sA/ss irn.org
pubs \%rr '-i6 nile.html> (date accessed:
\uvust 12, 21111 [Gladman: \la~sie Diversion].
52
"'Plans For Nc\ Nile Irrication Scheme CausCs Controvrers.' online: Hewett School Geograph\ Department <http: sx\s\\.hcctt.norfilk.,ch.uk .urncNcs(Ieog Africa ssater\a 7. htm> (date
accessed September 4,2104)
s
Professor Antony Allan as quoted. supru note 5I
54
xMan ( ooperman. Egypt Clone, a Nile Making the Desert Bloom - or \taking the V\ells go
Dry," (19 \l,I Il)7) online U S Ness <http: swr.usnesNs.com usnes- issue archise 970511)
1I99705 I l)i(,1-7_brief.php- (date accessed August 12, 21111.
5
Gladman: \la-i,,x e Divrersin. supra note S I

56

Ibid.

57. "Plans Fr Ncs Nile Irrigation Scheme Causes Controsers.* online: Hewett School Geography Department --http ,.\ vshsc\cts.norfolk sch .uk/CL RRIC NI xx(EOG Africa swater va7.htm>
(date acccsWd \uguiq 13. 20011. For some posihise developments, see Part IV below.

58.
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5')
Garretin The Nile Basin, %u/pinote 20 at 2 1.
60. Dellapenna Riscrs as Legal Structures. supta note 49 at 247.
(11 Svain The Nile Ri\er Dispute, mipri note 8 at 085, Dellapenna: Risers as Legal Structures,
supra note 49 at 244. Jacobs: Sharing the Gifts of the Nile, supra note I at 109.
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continued unchallenged since time immemorial, its long-established right
takes precedence over all other later claims, regardless of their naturc."'
The effect of this policy has meant that other riparians are banned from
using the Nile if such use interferes with Egypt's "natural and historical
rights" to the Nile N\atcrs. In other words, Egypt's existing use of the Nile
waters should remain unrestricted. Its relatively developed economy and
the internal crises in the other riparian states enabled Egypt to extract more
water than its fair share under the 1959 agreement.1 3 Giving primacy to
Egypt's use of the Nile negates "the concept of 'equitable utilization' that
is accepted as the controlling customary international law.". 4 In 1994, the
United Nations International Law Commission, after a careful review of
state practice, decisions of national and international tribunals and the works
of renowned jurists, concluded that the principle of equitable utilization as
laid down in Chapter 2 of the 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the

65
Waters of International Rivers is a customary rule of international lawN
6
governing the utilization of international rivers."
Ethiopia has adx ocated the principle of equitable utilization of the Nile.
The essence of this principle is that international rivers should be equitably. but not necessarily equally 7 apportioned among co-iparian states. In
short, the principle refers to equalilt of the rights of the riparian states to
use the waters. not to the equal division of the entire quantity of the watercourse. 68 The principle of equitable utilization requires co-basin states to

62. Chen: International Rier,. supra note 20 at 15-16. Dellapenna: Risers ai Legal Structures,
supra note 4,)at247.
63. Tadros: Shrinking \\ater Resource,. supra note 7 at 1() -1099
64. Dellapenna: Risers as Legal Structures. \upra note 49.at 241, There is an arra of authority on
the status of the pnnciple of equitable utilization. For instance, Fisseha argues that the principle of
equitable utilization had attained "the status of a customar\ rule of international law while the Conores] m., still in the process of
vention [on the \on-navigational Use of Internatomal Ilatrcu
elaboration." see Fisseha Yimer. "The Conention on the La., of the \on-'. igational Uses of
International Water, a,s" (II')7)Ethio', pc 13 at 16. But Getachew Aberra disputes Fisseha's
contention. He argues that there is not enough state practice to suggest that the principle has attained
the status of a customar, rule of international law see Getachem: Customar, International Law,
supra note 20 at 10.
'5. The Helsinki Rules (replaced by the Berlin Rules August 2004) were formally adopted on
August 20, 1966. bv the International Lam, Association in Helsinki, Finland at its 52"' Conference,
see International Law Assoctation. Report ,/the Filtv-Se'ond Conference Held at Helsinki (July
1966) at 447
66. Charles B. Bourne, "The International Law Association's Contribution to International Water
Resources Law," (1996) 36 Natural Resources Journal 155 at 215- 216.
67. Jerome Lipper, "Equitable Utilization- in A H Garretson, R.D. Hayton & C.L. Olmstead, eds,
The Law ofInternational Drainage Basins (New York: Oceana Publication, Inc., 1967) 15 at 44
[Lipper: Equitable Utilization].
68. Ibid.
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take into consideration all relevant factors and circumstances when working toward an obligation to utilize transboundary waters in an equitable
and reasonable manner."
There are now some indicators that the previous tensions over the Nile
are on the decline. The riparian states, including Egypt, seem convinced
that a more collaborative and imaginative approach is needed not only to
avoid conflicts as a result of competitive use of the Nile but also to maximize the benefits that could be generated from the Nile waters. Recently,
all the Nile states have started to engage in authentic discussion geared
towards reaching common understanding and accord. The next section
focuses on the reasons why basin-wide cooperation for the management
of the Nile is necessary.

III. WhY Cooperate Vow?
[There are] t%%o possible directions for Africa. One is of a glorious
renaissance.... The other is one in which %%e sink deeper into the abyss of
war, poverty, HIV/AIDS, disinvestments in human capital, and an ever-

mounting brain drain. At the dawn of the neN millennium, it is no
exaggeration to say that Africa stands at a stark crossroad.

70

Nowhere in Africa is this crossroad starker than in the Nile Basin. Here at
the crossroad... [the Nile countries] x ill choose the path of renaissance
- of cooperation and joint development, increasing all the flows along
the ris
or, addressing together the threats of poverty and conflict, opening
the swa, to greater harmony and integration among [the Nile] countries,
turning this great river into a river of opportunit\ and hope for all the
people of its countries."
As far as the utilization of the Nile is concerned, there seems to be
no alternative to cooperation."7 2 Several reasons canjustify this claim.

First, some hydrological studies of the Nile basin indicate that due to

69 Godana: Africa's Shared Waters. 'upra note 2) at 55
70. K.Y Amoako,quoted by Da\ id Grey. Opening Remarks on Behalf of the CIDA UNDP \Vorld
Bank Partnership on the Extraordinary Nile-COM Meeting (2,-29 March 2001 ) in Khartoum, Sudan,
online: Nile Basin Initiative <http://www.nilebasin.org CountrsN2 1 State m ents %o20l htmkVorld
Bank Statement (date accessed: July 6, 2001) [Gre.\: Opening Remarks].
71, Iid
72. James %\olfcnsohn,addressing the first cscrjoint meeting of the Ministers and high-ranking
officials from the Nile Basin countries with donors and international development agencies in Geneva,
Switzerland from 26-2, June 2001. "Ministers and Donors Full Development of Nile Basin" .lddis
Tribune (29 June 2101)11,
online: Addis Tribune <http. sxwv,.addistribune.com/ Archives/2001/06/
29-06-01 /Ministers him> Idatc accessed: June 3. 2005).
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4
the rapidly degenerating eco-system, 73 pollution from industrialization
and uncontrolled use of pesticides and fertilizer, the overall quality and
75
quantity of the Nile's water is decreasing. The region is also afflicted
with other problems such as desertification, deforestation and land degradation." Kinfe Abraham, Head of an Ethiopian think tank, maintains that
"Itfhe ecological degradation taking place in the Ethiopian highlands will
in the long-term exacerbate Ethiopia's water level and adversely affect the
volume of water which will flow to the other countries like Egypt whose
7
needs are also bound to rise because of the demographic pressure."" To
address these problems the riparian states need to adopt a holistic and
integrated approach that recognizes the interdependencies between resource
development and environmental management. This approach involves the
adoption of measures and standards to protect the environment both at the
national and at the regional levels.
Second, famine and drought have almost become synonymous with
the Nile basin countries. Cyclical drought and famine in Ethiopia claims
hundreds of lives e\ cry four to five \cars. The heavy dependency of Ethiopia
on rain-fed agriculture and the unreliable nature of rainfall are said to be
the main causes of crop failure that repeatedly lead to serious food shortages and famine. To attain food self-sufficiency, Ethiopia needs to use its
water resources, including the Blue Nile, for irrigation purposes. The
remaining riparian states also have agricultural economies" and are trying
0
to pursue their share of the Nile waters for irrigation purposes as well."
Added to this is the challenge posed by an ever-increasing population. In
the year 2000, the estimated number of people living in the riparian states
was 300 million." This number is projected to rise to 812 million by the

73.
74

75,

Kinfe: The Nile Issue, supra note 10 at 42
Tadros: Shrinking \\ater Resources. upra note 7 at 10i92

Carroll: Past and Futuresupra note 20at 270: Mann: Nile \%aterssupranote 42 at 5;Caponera:

Legal Aspects, supra note 8 at ( h, Jacobs: Sharing the Gifts of the Nile. supra note I at 116.
Swain: The Nile River Dispute, supra note 8 at 684-6X6
7h
Kinfe: The Nile Issue, supra note I0 at 42
7.
7R. Daniel: Hydro-politics of the Blue Nile, supra note 8 (13 August 19991 at 1I.

)
79 Godana: Africa's Shared Waters. supra note 20 at X1.
80. Caponera: Legal Aspects. supra note 8 at 6,6. Mekete: Sharing Nile Waters, supra note 20 at
9; Valentina Okaru-Bisant, "Institutional and Legal Frameworks for Preventing and Resolving Dis-

putes Concerning the Development and Management of Africa's Shared Riser Basins" (1998) 9

Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 331 at 332 [Okaru-Bisant: Institutional and Legal Framework]; Godana:
Africa's Shared Waters, supra note 20 at 83-X4, Rushdi Said "The Waters of the Nile: Cooperation
or Conflict?" ( 1997) 7 ,fiddIc East Exsecutive Rcpt 16 [Said: The Waters of the Nile]; Tadros:
Shrinking Water Resources, supra note 7 at 1099.
81. World Bank, "Nile Basin: Overvew," online: The World Bank Group http://www.worldbank.
org, afr nilebasm/> (date accessed August 4, 2001 )
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year 2040.'2 Such a major population explosion will surely increase the
demand placed by riparian states on Nile wvaters. When countries that share
a common natural resource unilaterally try to harness this common
resource, conflicts are bound to arise. It is not difficult to imagine what
x ill occur \\hen the riparian states engage in unilateral withdrawal of
w\ater in order to satisfy their pressing economic and population needs.
Third, the cooperative use of the Nile presumably would increase the
xolume of water available in the basin as \\ ell as reduce the silting that is
causing serious problems in the downstream dams of Egypt and the Sudan. 3
The water lc\el of .,\s\an Dam is decreasing as a result of sediment
siltation." Similarly, floods are causing problems to the irrigation projects
and darns of the Sudan.'
Cooperatix e use and management of the Nile would also reduce evaporation \Nhich isa major problem in the Nile basin." In the Sudd region of
the Sudan 2) to 25 billion cubic meters (BCM) is lost annually due to
evaporation.' Similarly, close to 30 BCMl a \ear is lost in the Bahr
El- Ghazal basin and in the marshes that block the Sobat Rtx erY"One very
critical strategy to reduce water loss due to ex aporation would be to create
regional water reservoirs in non-arid climatic regions. As reckoned by
Daniel Kendie:
...b. blasting a deep outlet and erecting a dam, about six billion cubic
meters of water can be stored in Lake Tana. The advantage of storing

s2 Jacobs sharing the (ilfl of the Nile, supra note I at 117, quoting Heba SaIeh, "Countries Near
Loniet River Grapple With \\atcr Shortage" Toronto Sltr (5 August 1990) H2
s. \\ arren Gilc,,."International Econom,,: Nile Nation, Funded to Nid \\ater Sharing," Financial
Time-s 13 Jul\ 2001 ).online: Financial Times <V,Vsi\ryg:/439 http: globalarchixe. ft.co...
es.
html 'id
l10110AI 104
l4&qucrs Nile+ri ver> (date acce,sed: 12 Jul. 2 001) [Giles: Nile Nations].
4
inter\ ew of Prolc,,orTeferi T,ega. "'c \ u,tGet our \cIe,agc About the Nile Across Slow ly
but with A,.surcdn.c.s," The"Reporter ( 12 July 2001 )A(, [Professor Tefert: We M..ut Get Our Mes,.age \cross]. By some estimates, 60 to 100 tons of debris enters the Nile riser annually. The sedimentation rate in Lgvpt stands a rather high lcs
elof 6 to 15 cm per centur. ' ,.hile in the Sudan the
figures vo up to 30 cm, see Tc,favc The Nile Question. supra note 39 at 31.
X5 Prolessor Teferi \\c \lu,t Get Our \essage Across, supra note 54 at A6
S6
'Nile Basin Nations Mo'oe Towards (ooperation," online: Oneworld <http: w\vv.onev.orld.
org eucnflict publicat'n 13. Ipage 13.html' (date accessed: Jul,13,210)11. Caponera: Legal Aspects, supru note X at i,'3 Kinfe Abraham, "Nile Imperatics: Avenues Toward \ \tin-\\ in Situation," online: EIIPD • http: Asw.eiipd org research/nile".,2)isue mic imperat, es.himn THE HISTORICAL> (date accessed: September 7,21)1)4). As noted b\ Kendie. "...evaporation losses from
rcerr, ..amount[] io one-meter depth per ,car in Ethiopia. compared \.ith over three meters
depth at ,\s\an, the actual potential rate of evaporation in the world. \.hile the evaporation loss in
Ethiopia %%ill
be only Yo, in I-gypt it %%ill be 12"o," see Daniel: ll.dropolitics ofthe Blue Nile, supra
note X at I
,7 Said: The \\,iicr, of the Nile, supra note 80
.0s
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such water in the high and cool sites in Ethiopian uplands would enhance
weater available for both Ethiopia and its down stream neighbours.
tile
Imirrigation may be
The amount of weater that lIthiopia w\ould utilie fr
equikalent to the amount of x,ater lost bv l-gypt through evaporation.
Authorities in the held aruue that e\en if Ethiopia draws off Six Kin' of
water, Eg\ pt and S;udan \,ould still benefit from the construction ofdamis
in Ethiopia. The amount of water to Egypt and the Sudan would not be
affected.'
Fourth. the current legal framework over Nile management is uncertain
for different reasons. The treaties are not all encompassing and deal with
very limited issues. mainly water sharing. Furthermore, the excluded
riparians do not recognize the treaties and agreements on the Nile."" In the
absence of a comprehensive legal framew\rork, states may engage in unilateral use of Nile waters, which will most likely cause conflict. What is
more, the Sudan. which is the second largest beneficiary of the Nile waters
under the current treaty regime. has expressed its dissatistLiction with the
only post-colonial treaty,' the 1951) water agreement. \\hich fixes its share
at 18.5 BCM.' Consequently. the diplomatic relationship between Egypt
and the Sudan has deteriorated. When Sudan threatened to block the Nile
wNaters bv dix erting its direction. Hosni \lubarak did not hesitate to threaten
war against the Sudan. He declared that -[t]hose who play with fire in Khartoum
.will push us to confrontation and to defend our rights and our lives. " "
Rushdi Said. the former head of the Egyptian Geological Survey and
%lining Authority. argued that conflict over the Nile water ' ... would be
not only extremely unwise. but also uncalled for, because the Nile basin
has enough water to satisfy the present needs of all its inhabitants.""" He
added that if the riparians agree to develop and manage the Nile, it has
enough fresh water resources to meet all their needs." Currently, out of the
total 476 BC\I of water that is potentially ax ailable to the riparian states
per year, less than half or 227 BC \1 is being used.'.

'9, Daniel: Hydro-politics of the Blue Nile. vupra note 8 at 15 For detailed discussion on this
point. see generally. Elhance, supra note 6. Colhns, supra note I.
gii
Tadros Shrinking xxater Resources. supra note 7 at 1096.
'q1 Caponera: Legal ,,pects. supra note X at 660. Swain: The Nile River Dispute. supra note 8 at
685 and Said: The %xatcrs of the Nile, supra note 80 at 17.
92. --water as a xxeapon" 15 July I916) 6 II Sudan (pdatc quoted in Swain: The Nile River
Dispute, supra note 8 at 685.
93. Said: The Waters of the Nile, supra note 80 at 17.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
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These various factors underscore the need for an integrated approach
geared towards optimal utilization of the Nile by all of the riparian states.
The basin states must work out a comprehensive treaty that can address
the interests of all of them and the important issues thus far relegated to
the background before affairs degenerate into crisis.
Arguably, the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
InternationalWaterways (hereafter Convention) can provide a good starting point for a comprehensive Nile basin agreement."' Articles 5 and 7 are
deemed to be the "twin cornerstones" of the entire Convention because
they set out the governing principles for the utilization of international
watercourses.f 7
Article 5 sets forth the long-established principle of an equitable and
reasonable utilization of international watercourses.98 This principle
allows each riparian state to "... utilize an international watercourse within
its territory in an 'equitable and reasonable manner' as long as it takes into
consideration the legitimate rights and interests of all other users."99 It
should be noted that this principle does not require an equal sharing of a
common river among basin states. Rather, it demands that the needs of
each state be considered on an equal basis with the needs of other water-

96. There seems to be a disagreement concerning the relevance of this Convention for the formulation of a basin wide Nile agreement. For instance. Carroll says that the ConN ention does not provide "guidelines on how to formulate a regional agreement" and it "cannot provide for the preliminary steps that Nile state. must take before they negotiate a regional agreement." She adds: the "...
Convention cannot resol\ e the underlying problems impeding cooperation, such as lack of shared
understanding of Nile problems and weak domestic water regulator\ systems," see Carroll: Past and
Future, .upra note 20 at 271 & 286-291. Similarly, Nahid Islam argues that as the Convention is
highly western, both in terms of content and procedure, it barelx reflects the socio-economic and
cultural circumstances of developing countries She advocates for a participation of user communities in resource management and decision-making process at the national level. See Nahid Islam,
Rethinking The Law of \on-Navigational Uses of International Watercourse: Options for Regional

Regime-Building inAsia (J.S.D. Dissertation, Law, Dalhousie University, 1998) at 4 [unpublished].
In a similar vein Schwsabach, based on the voting pattern of states, argues that in situations where
there are developing upper nparian states "the Convention is not likel'y to provide useful guidance,
except in a erx limited sense." Schwabach: The United Nations Convention, supra note 38 at 260270. Out of the ten Nile states only Kenya and the Sudan voted in fasour of the Convention. Egypt,
Ethiopia, Tanzania and Rwanda abstained from voting while Burundi soted against the Convention.
The rcmaining countries did not take part in the vote. See Convention on the Law of Non-navigational _es ,,/ Intcrnationalllutercourses, 21 May 1997, G.A.Res. 51/229, U.N. GAOR, 51' Sess.,

99' plen. mtg., UN. Doc A5 I /PV.99 (1997); Jacobs: Shanng the Gifts of the Nile, supra note I at
120.
97. Stephen McCaffrey. "The Lass of International Watercourses: Some Recent Developments and
Unanswered Questions" (1989) 17 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 505 at 508.
98. ('ovention on the Law o, Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses,21 May 1997,
G.A.Res 51/229, U.N. GAOR, 5I" Sess., 99', plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES 51/229 (1997); reprinted
in 36 I.L.M. 700 (1997) [Convention].
99. Tadros: Shrinking Water Resources, supra note 7 at 1105.
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course states." t As discussed previously, the principle of equitable utilization gives each riparian of an international basin the equal rights to utilize
the waters of the basin.' 0 ' This principle does not imply that each riparian
has an equal claim to the basin waters; rather, it is interpreted to mean that
each riparian's needs are to be considered on an equal basis in relation to
the needs of the other states sharing the basin. "' 2 Article 6 of the Convention provides a non-exhaustive list of the relevant factors that need to be
taken into consideration when determining whether a state's utilization of
water resources is equitable and reasonable. 0 3 Article 7 requires watercourse states to take all appropriate measures not to cause significant harm
to other watercourse states.'"
In their recent dialogues under the Nile Basin Initiative, to be discussed
in Part V, the riparian states have accepted the principle of equitable
utilization as a guiding principle in their efforts to forge a comprehensive
agreement on the Nile.' The problem with this principle, however, is that
"the same platitudinous quality which makes it so agreeable also makes it
disturbingly vague and uncertain."'" In other words, as is the case with
any other legal principle, the principle does not provide "an infallible
matrix for problem solving.'"_ Rather riparian states could use these
factors to arrive at different conclusions of what constitutes equitable and

100. Jacobs: Shanng the Gits of the \ile. supra note I at 99. Charles B. Bourne, "The International
Law A\ssociation's Contnbution to International Water Resources Law" (1996) 36 Nat. Resources J.
at 158.

101. Jacobs: Shanng the Gifts of the Nile, supra note I at 99.
102 Ibid.
103. Ibid. The factors are: (a) geographical, hydrographical, hydrological, climatic, ecological and
other factors of a natural character. (b) The 'octal and economic needs of the watercourse States
concerned. (c) The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State; (d) The
effects of the use or uses of the watercourse in one watercourse State on other watercourse States; (e)
Existing and potential uses of the watercourse; (f)Conservation, protection, deN elopment and economy
of use of water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect. (g) The
availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or existing use.
104. Comention, supra note 98, Article 7.

105. Nile Basin Initiati%e, "Celebrating Cooperation on the Nile" online: Nile Basin Initiative <http:/
/www.nilebasin.org I CONI.htm> (date accessed: August 15, 2001).
106. William WVan Alstyne, "International Law and Interstate River Dispute" (1960) 48:4 Cal. L.
Rev. 596 at 617. Explaining the problematic nature of the principle Lord Selden is quoted as saying
"Equity is a roguish thing: for Law we have a measure, know what to trust to, Equity is according to
the Conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity. 'Tis all one
as if they should make the Standard for the measure, we call, a Chancellor's Foot, what an uncertain
measure would this be? One Chancellor has a long Foot, another a short Foot, a third an indifferent
Foot. 'Tis the same thing in the Chancellor's Conscience." Eugene C. Gerhart, Quote It!: Memorable Legal Quotations(New York: C. Boardman Co., 1969) at 198.
107. Jacobs: Sharing the Gifts of the Nile, supra note I at 99.
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reasonable utili/ation ofthe Nile \s aIcrs.t " In the view ofEyla Benvenisti,
however, such \agueness is a blessing in disguise."" The vague nature of
the principle, it is argued, gives the riparian states sufficient leeway to
formulate an arrangement that best suits their particular interests and
situations. Similarly, Nebiyou, Daniel and Kentaro argue that:
(enerallN speaking, there are hardl,, an), rules., Ahether in international
or municipal law, \which a priori establish a decis.e solution to such a
politically contested issue [the apportionment of shared water courses].
lIach case is so specific and unique that it is hardly possible tbr a set of
legal rules to predict c\cr. possible situation. ' '
The\ further assert that "it seems fair to say that the role of international
law can and ought to play is not so much to establish a conclusive rule on
apportionment of shared water resources as to offer a legal framework of a
general nature based on which co-basin states ma' be encouraged to
negotiate and settle the dispute by thernselves."''
For far too long the tone and substance of the relationship among the
Nile riparian states has been characterized b\ fierce competition, mutual
suspicion, latent antagonism and ce~n threats of \\ar. In recent years,
however, the basin has witnessed a paradigm shift in which states talk
about cooperati\e and sustainable development of the river as well as
possible regional economic integration. As argued above, efficient and
equitable \\ater management \\ill haxe an important contribution to the
long-term political, economic, and environmental security of the basin for
the Nears to come.'" The next part examines the major recent developments as far as a cooperati\e use and management of the Nile is
concerned.

IV Recent Developments
As stated in Part I1,the lack of trust and common understanding among the
riparians concerning the sharing and management of the Nile has long

108.

Carroll: Pat and Future.
cupra
note 20 at 255-2S').
109 Eyal Benvenisti, C'ollectise \ction in the .iulization of Shared Freshxater: the Challenge of
Internatonal '\alcr Reourccs Law" 11996) 90 A.J.I.L 384 at 403.

110. \ebiu Dagnc, Daniel Bekele Mulugeta & Kentaro KAihara. "to\%ards a Cooperatie Use of
the Nile: A Legal Perspective" 11999) 12:2 CRIA 22(, at 233 [Dagne Tow.ards a Cooperati, Use].
I 1I. hid
112. Jeremy Berkoff. I Strattr /I 11,no,1g,,g it ner in ii
ington, D( . \\orld Bank. 1994) at 1.

Ihddlc East and \,rth .tlrica, (Wash-

The Nile Basin: From Confrontation to Cooperation

been a feature of Nile resource management. Recently, the Nile riparian
states, with the help of the international community, have embarked on a
new road towards the cooperative use and management of Nile waters.
Accordingly, the riparian states are conducting annual conferences
called the Vile 2002 Series, which are intended to bring together water
experts from the basin states as well as from around the world."' The
overarching goal of this series of conferences is to create "unofficial and
informal venues" for valuable and constructive discussion and exchange
of intellectual ideas.'" The latest meeting, the ninth Conference of Nile
2002. was held in Nairobi, Kenya from October 7-9, 2002. At the conclusion of the conference, the countries underscored the importance of cooperative use of the Nile in order to attain an optimal and efficient use of the
river.''5
In an earlier similar project. six 'of the riparian states (including Egypt)
established the Technical Co-operation Committee for the Promotion oj
the Development and Environment Protection of the Nile Basin

(TECCONILE) in December 1992. TECCONILE was charged with the
task of preparing an agreement for the establishment of a regional organization, including the remaining riparian countries. In February 1999, the
riparian states, except Eritrea. signed the Agreed Minutes in Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania.' Under this arrangement the countries adopted the Nile
River Basin Strategic Action Program (NRBAP).1 The Program consists
of two interrelated sub-programs namely, the Shared Vision Program and

113. Swain: The Nile River Dispute. supra note 8 at 691. The first Nile 2002 conference was held in

A\ssan (Egypt) in February 1993, followed by the second in Khartoum (Sudan) in January 1994, the
third in Arusha (Tanzania) in February 1995, the fourth in Kampala (Uganda) in February 1996, the
fifth held in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia in February 1997, the sixth conference was held in Kigali
(Rwanda) in February 1998. the sesenth in Cairo (Egypt) in March 1999, the eighth held in Addis
Ababa (Ethiopia) in June 2000, the ninth Conference N~as held in Nairobi (Kenya) in 2002. See
Program of the Eighth Nile 2002 Conference. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 126-29 July 2000) at I [on file

with the author].
114. Ibid.
115. Nile Basin lnitiatie, 95 Nile 2002 Conference, online: Nile Basin Initiative <http://www.

nilebasin.org/DocumentsiOther Docs!Nile0 o202002%20Brochure.doc> (date accessed: September

4, 2004).
116. The countries are Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda;
the remaining countries were obsersers, which joined the arrangement subsequently, see Nile Basin
Initiative, "History of the Nile Basin Initiative," online: Nile Basin Initiative <http://
www.nilebasin.org/nbihistory.htm> (date accessed: August 10, 2001 )[NIB: History].
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid.

119. Ibid.
120. Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin States, "Policy Guidelines for the Nile
River Basin Strategic Action Program," online: Nile Basin Initiative <http://www. nilebasin.org/
Documents/TACPolicy.html> (date accessed: August 10, 2001).
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the Subsidiary Action Program. 20
The Shared Vision program is geared towards creating a conducive
environment for the implementation of the shared vision through action
on the ground, within a basin-wide framework.' 2 ' The projects that have
been developed and agreed upon by the riparians under the "Shared Vision
Program" are
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
t)
g)

Confidence building and stakeholder involvement,
Environmental analyses and management,
Promoting power trade,
Efficient uses of water for agriculture,
Socio-economic, enironmental and sectoral analysis,
Water resources planning and management. and
Applied training

The Subsidiary Action Programs, on the other hand, are intended to "...plan
and implement action on the ground at the lowest appropriate level...'">
They consist of development projects at the sub-basin level, involving two
or more countries."4 The two Subsidiary Action Programs are the Eastern
Nile (EN-SAP) which currently consists of Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt;
while the Nile Equatorial Lakes Region (NEL-SAP) includes Burundi, the
1 25
Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.
In February 1999, the riparians' 2 launched a new partnership called
the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) which succeeded the TECCONILE."' 7 NBI
is a transitional regional partnership in which the countries of the Nile
basin are grouped together to develop and manage the Nile in a "sustainable and equitable" manner.' The establishment of the NBI may be
regarded as a breakthrough in the history of Nile basin cooperation. What
makes the NBI unique is that it involves all riparians in collective manage-

121 Nile Basin Initiame. "Nile Basin Initiative Program," online: <http: \s.nilebasin. org/
nbiprocess-htm> (date accessed: August 10, 2001) [NIB: Program]122. Ibid.; "Nile Basin Initiative - Current Activities," online: Nile Basin Initiative <http:/ www.
nilcbasin.org current",,20activies.htm>-(date accessed: August 13, 2001 )[NIB: Current Activities].
123. NIB: Program. supra note 121.
124 Ibid
125. NIB: Current Actixities, supra note 122.
120 Eritrea is not a formal member yet. It has been participating as an observer and has shown
strong interest tojoin the regional partnership, see Nile Basin Initiatise, News Release, "Nile Basin
Officials Meet to t inaliie Recommendations on Joint Projects" (No. 01 3 23). online: Nile Basin
Initiative <http:'/wwxs nilebasin.org/pressrcleases.htm#Nile Basin Officials Meet to Finalize Recommendations on Joint Projects> (date accessed: August 3,20011.
127. NIB: History, supra note 116.
128 NIB: Program, supra note 121.
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ment for the first time in the history of the Nile.
The objectives of the NBI include the development of the Nile water
resources "...in a sustainable and equitable way to ensure prosperity,

security and peace for all its people; to ensure cooperation and joint action
between the riparian states, seeking 'win-win' gains; to eradicate poverty;
and promote economic integration." ' Since the establishment of the NBI,
the member states have been actively engaged in discussions and in the
development of what is referred to as the "Shared Vision" to address some
of the problems that ha\e been wracking the Nile Basin. The shared vision
of the NBI is "[t]o achieve sustainable socio-economic development through
the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin
130
water resources."
The NBI is composed of three transitional institutions, namely, the
Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin (Nile-COM), the
Technical Advisory Committee (Nile TAC) and the Nile Basin Secretariat
(Nile SEC) located in Entebbe. Uganda. "3 ' The Council of Ministers is
composed of the water affairs ministers of the riparian states and is the
highest decision-making organ of the NBL. 2 The Technical Advisory
33
Committee is composed of two senior officials from each Nile country
and serves as the technical organ of the NBI. The Nile SEC carries out the
day-to-day activities of the NBI under the direction of the Nile-TAC.' 34
It is also in charge of coordinating and monitoring the activities of the
working groups of the two sub-programs.13-5
The three-day meeting of the International Consortium for Cooperation on the Nile (ICCON) held in Geneva, Switzerland from June 26-28,
2001136 can be regarded as a landmark event in the history of the Nile. For
the first time, ministers of water affairs and senior government officials

129. Nile Basin Initiative, "Celebrating Cooperation on the Nile," online: Nile Basin Initiative <http:/
/\wv,.nlebasin.org/ICCON I.htm> (date accessed: July 6, 2i01)1 .
130. As declared on the Nile Basin lnitiati.e Homepage, online: Nile Basin Initiative <http://
wwx,.nilebasin.org'> (date accessed: July 6, 2001).
131. Ibid.

132. Nile Basin Initiative, News Rcease. "Nile Basin Officials Meet to Finalize Recommendations
on Joint Projects" (No. 01/3/23), online: Nile Basin Initiative <http://www.nilebasin org,
pressreleases.htmnNile Basin Officials Mcct to Finalize Recommendations on Joint Projects> (date
accessed: July 6, 2001).

133. Nile Basin initiative, "Nile Basin Initiative Technical Advisory Committee Nile-TAC," online:
Nile Basin Initiative <http:/, \&wA.nilebasin.org/ ile-tac. htm#Start > (date accessed: July 24, 2001 ).
134. Nile Basin Initiative, "Nile Basin Initiative Secretariat," online: Nile Basin Initiative <http://
www.nilebasin.org/nile-sec.htm> (date accessed: July 24, 2001.

135. Ibid.
136. Nile Basin Initiative, "Strategic Action Program Overview Document," online: Nile Basin Initiative <http://www.nilebasin.org/overvieA-chapter 2.htm> (date accessed: September 4. 2004).
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from all tie Nile basin states, together with the donor community and civil
society representatives, gathered in one place with a shared commitment
to de\ clop an integrated plan for the use and conservation of the Nile. The
I(tCON \\ as set up by the World Bank upon the requests of the Nile-COM
in order to coordinate donor support for the NBI action plan and to
con\ one a consultati\e group meeting." The ICCON is a newly created
platform conducit\e to the discussion and planning required to map out the
options and opportunities for the unified and comprehensive development
of the Nile Basin. 138
This meeting gave rise to cautious optimism that confrontation and
mistrust xill be replaced by a spirit of cooperation and trust. At the
conclusion of this meeting, decelopment partners pledged financial
support of at least SI 4() million.3' During this meeting. the World Bank
promised to establish i Trust Fund to finance the full program the NBI
presented to ICCON.
The ICC ON initiative marks a shift in the international community's
approach to the issue of Nile xaters management. Historically, the international community, generally speaking, had pursued a "hands off"
approach concerning Nile water issues. This \\as especially true regarding
the \Vorld Bank's Operating Directives. OD 6.50, which required a
consensus from all the riparians before grants or loans could be made for a
water project on an international water resource in the territory of one of
the riparians. "'" This restricted lending policy cemented the status quo,
thcrcb\ protecting and reinforcing Egxpt's traditional non-cooperatixe
position.
,\t the conclusion of the ICCON meeting, the President of the World
Bank, James Wolfensohn, expressed the Bank's readiness to support and
promote the ncxx spirit of cooperation and partnership among the Nile states
in order to dc\elop the \\atcrs of the Nile in a sustainable and equitable
manner for the benefit of all. Mr. Wolfensohn assured the participants that
the Bank, together x\ith the international community. is prepared to
prox ide the necessarv financial support for dexelopment projects as

137.

Iid.

online \ile Basin Initiatie

http: x%\ \ nilebasin.org ICi(

\ i .htm> (date accessed:

July 24, 2001 ).
113, World Bank, Ne\ s Release, "Donor Community Supports Posertx Reduction. Prosperity and
Peace through ihc Nilc Basin Initiati\c" (No. ()I 06 2,) [,orld Bank: Donor Community].
139. Iid
140. I)cilapenna: Rivers as Legal Structures, stu/ra note 41)at 146 -14'
141 Ibid at 247 n 162 For an excellent discussion about what measures the Bank needs to take in
order to make significant contribution to Africa's wsater basins see Okaru-Bisant: Institutional and
Legal Framessork, sipra note 80 at 359-361.
142 \,,rld Bank: Donor Communil. , mpi-i note 13K
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further cooperation bct\\ccn the Nile countries develops.42 The active involvement of the international community, especially the World Bank, in
pooling resources and coordinating Support from other donors is another
unique feature of the current initiative.
Most importantly, in December 2003, the co-basin states established
the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Negotiating Committee, which is
composed of very senior ranking government officials, with a mandate to
recommend a legal institutional framework for the development and
management of the Nile Basin water resources."' Despite the dearth of
information on its exact content, the Committee "... has developed a draft
Cooperative Framework Agreement. understandably marred by many
square brackets.""
Dellapenna rightly claims that a transboundary rix cr should be considered as a "common property resource" since its over use by one riparian is
likely to have a diminishing impact on the benefits that could be derived
by other co-basin states."' Consequently, -[i]deal economic efficiency
would seem to dictate that a water basin be treated as a single unit, with
optimal basin-xxide calculations of wrater utilization including an inventory of soils, feasibilit\ of irrigation and drainage, xalues of alternatixe
crops, and domestic and industrial w ater needs."'4 In the face of the extreme difficulty in forging international agreements on shared water resources "... the ideal solution to the satisfaction of competing needs and
conflicting interests is unitary basin-xwide dcvelopment of water resources
under some system of supranational authority or management.""- Hence,
each water state should acknowledge the legitimate interests of the others
and should be willing to cooperate w ith a view to making optimal use of
the resources.
The following section therefore addresses the need for a viable legal
arrangement and a permanent supranational institutional framework for
the use and management of the Nile.
143 Nile Basin Initiamtxe. Nesz Release. "The Nile: Forging the Path of Cooperation'" (No. 4 ii2
htm> (date accessed: Sep26). online: NiIe Basin Initiative <http: www.nilebasin.org prerle
tember 24. 201)4,
144 Se i feelas, ie Lemma. "Cooperating on the N ile not a Zero-Sum Game" L uifed ations Chronicle
(Sept.- No\ 2001), online: Ethiopian Embas,\. <http: \ww.ethioembassy.org.uk/articles/articles/
November',,1)O1/nile article.htm> (date accessed: September 24. 2004)

145 Dellapenna: Treaties as Instrument,. supra note 6 at 51. see also Tesfaye: The Nile Question,
supra note 39 at 3.Tesfaye asserts that in the case of the Nile "[i]f, for instance, Ethiopia develops
upper Nile waters, Egypt ssill lose out, and converscly. if Igypt insists on maintaining the [stat.%
quo]. that is. insisting on becoming the sole beneficiarN of the Nile, all other riparian states will lose

out. This is what is called a _ero-um game and results in suspicion, distrust, tension and even war if
one is certain to win." Tesfaye: The Nile Question, supra note 37 at 3.
146. Daniel J.Epstein, "Making the Desert Bloom: Competing for Scarce Water Resources in the
& Comp. L. J.395 at 4(11-402 [Epstein: Making the
Jordan River Basin" (1996) 10 Temp. Int'l
Desert Bloom]; see also Tesfaye: The Nile Question, supra note 37 at 3.
147. Epstein: Making the Desert Bloom, supra note 146 at 402
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V Need For a Permancnt Legal and InstitutionalFramework
As noted in Part II of this article, one of the problems in the use and
management of the Nile River has been the lack of a comprehensive basin\wide treaty. One major reason why such an agreement was never
concluded was because of Egypt's firm and consistent assertion of its
"superior historical" right to the Nile waters."' Egypt, based on its misdiagnosis of the Nile issue as a zero-sum game, rejected all calls for a more
equitable and coordinated development of the Nile water as merely a
demand that it relinquish its privileges. Fortunately, there have been some
changes in Egypt's previously held position.
Egypt has come to realize that the lasting solution to the Nile question
is an integrative and complementary use of the river. In addition to its
active participation in the NIB, where co-basin states discuss equitable
sharing of the Nile Water and, in fact, de\ elop a number of joint water
projects, in recent years Egypt has made some striking public declarations
acknowledging the rights of other riparian states in the Nile waters. For
instance, in 1998, the then Egyptian Ambassador to Ethiopia, Marawan
Badr announced that:
Egypt recognizes that each state has the right to equitable utilization of its
waters in accordance \\vith international law. Egypt further recognizes that
existing water agreements do not hinder the utilization of the Nile waters
by any of the riparian states. Egypt is ready to cooperate with Ethiopia in
exploiting its huge hydro-electric power potentials, and did not object to
the construction of small scale \\ater dams."'
In July 1993, Egypt and Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding
in which the two countries agreed to consider the Nile as a "center of
mutual interest."'"' While visiting Ethiopia in December 2003, Egyptian
Foreign Minister Favaza Aboulnaga, expressed Egypt's readiness to
provride technical assistance to Ethiopia for utilisation of Nile water
resources especially in developing its irrigation systems for agriculture."'t

148 Tadros: Shrinking Water Resources, wqpra note 7 at 1096.

141) Ambassador \larawan Badr, "Egypt and the Horn of Africa: The True Perspectnie' Addis Tribune (7 August 1998) at A3: see also "'tgypt Explains Position about the Nile Waters" Pan African
\rew, .genc)' (6 April 2001 ), online: Sudan.net <http:/iwww. sudan.net nec\'s posted'2013> (date
accesevcd September 5, 200(41;
150 FAO, -1993 Framcwork for General Cooperation Between Eg. pt and Ethopia," Preamble,
online: f AO <http://www-x\.fao.org.docrep/w7414b.iw7440p htm> (date accessed: September 4. 2004).
151. Cam McGrath & Sonny lnbaraj, "Claiming the Nile" I/wi & Guardian (18 January 2004),
online: Mail & Guardian online <http://\ww.mg.co.zaiContent/13.aspao=29806 > (date accessed:
September 4. 2004,
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No\\ that the Nile countries haxe started to cooperate on the use of
Nile waters, it seems only appropriate to discuss the legal and institutional
arrangements required for a unified and comprehensive development of
the basin. The riparian states need to back up their " ...remarkable and
fragile first step...""' with a comprehensive basin-wide agreement. The
riparians should conclude a treat\ that clearly sets out the rules and
principles to ,o\ern the use and development of the basin. As stated in
Part IV the Convention can serve as an appropriate starting point. The
existing bilateral agreements, including the 1959 agreement between Egypt
and the Sudan, must be replaced with a comprehensive basin-wide
arrangement.
The agreement should, inter alia, take into account the multifaceted
and admittedly often contradictory interests and concerns of the riparian
states. As discussed in Part IV the combined population of the riparian
states is predicated to rise from 300 million today to 800 million in 2040.54
Such a burgeoning population. coupled wxith the introduction and operation of energ\ intensive industnes \hich require the harnessing of water
to produce electric power. and the recurrent drought in the region will
5
place increasing demands on the limited water resources of the Nile.' 5
The agreement should also clearly specify measures that should be taken
in emergency situations. enironmental protection measures, dispute
prevention and settlement mechanisms, water storage options, problems
of evaporation and, of course. wrater sharing."' As international law
principles do not provide a ready-made formula for \\ ater sharing, the agreement should also pro\ ide principles for resource sharing and ho\\, in what
manner, and by \N hat proportion. the riparian states ought to share the
waters of the Nile.
It should be noted that the existence of an agreement on the use of the
Nile is insufficient in itself to ensure the proper management of the river.

I52.

\\orld Bank: Donor Community. supru note 138.

153. For Egypt, access and control ovcr the Nile ssater has vital implications for its sosereignty and
survival. As previously noted, approximately 98% of Eg)pt's fresh water supply comes from the

\ile. Hence, many Egyptians fear that an\ compromise that would give the riparian states control
over the Nile water might put Egypt in a disadvantaged position. On the other hand, given the relative peace and stability in the country, Ethiopia is now trying to implement different water projects
in the upper reaches of the Nile for agncultural and hydropower production purposes. See Ashok
Swain, "'ANes Challenge: Water ScarcitN in the Arab World Precious Water: Growing Demand and
increasing Scarcity" (Winter 1998) 20:1 Arab Studies Quartrl Ionline: <http:/ web macamac.il/

-arnon/lnt-ME water vater ,20scarcity'o 20in',, 2()thc"0'20Arab'20world.htm> (date accessed:
September 7, 20041.
15 4 Jacobs: Sharing the Gifts of the Nile, supra note I at 117.
155. Ibid.

156. Carroll: Past and Future, supra note 20 at 300-303.
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Instead, the legal framework needs to be supported by an institutional
arrangement that implements the rules set forth in the agreement. Furthermore. the proper management of Nile water resources requires the
undertaking of a range of different activities, notably the collection,
centralization, standardization and dissemination of technical data, the
continuous supervision of the various projects and development programs,
and the prevention and settlement of disputes among the basin states.'57

Such an institutional arrangement would provide a forum for consultation
and discussions on project development and financing as well as tackling
problems that may occur in the future.'
Different types of institutional arrangements, with differing degrees of
autonomy, duration, function, purpose and jurisdiction, have been created
to regulate and coordinate the use and development of an international

watercourse."' Such international bodies have included, commissions,
authorities and committees." ' Factors such as "the importance, number
and geographical location of the water resources concerned ... the administrative and economic infrastructure of the states concerned, and the latters'
[sic] readiness to confer regulatory, executive or quasi-judicial functions
on a joint body," inter alia, serx e as factors for selecting a particular governing structure."'
The Approved Action Plan of the UN Water Conference held in Mar
del Plata, Argentina. in 1977, underscored the need for the establishment

157 P.K. \Ienon, -Institutiona Mechanisms For the De\ elopment of International Water Resources"
(1972)8 Rev B.DI O at 8l [Menon: Institutional Iechanisms],
I 5, George E Radoc\ ich, "Implementation: Joint Institutional Management and Remedies in Dometic Tribunals" ( 192) 3 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 260 at 263-264 [Radosevich: Joint Institutional Management]; see also Okaru-Bisant: Institutional and Legal Framework, supra note 80 at
15). For instance, the 1960 Frontier Treat\ between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands etablished the permanent Netherlands-Germany Boundary \\ater Commission. H. Hohman,
Bavc Doc uflients of InternationaI EnvironmentalLao (London: Graham and Trotman Ltd.. 1992) at
1159 The 1960 Indus Treat. betsween India and Pakistan established the Permanent Indus Commission. L N, Ltcitlutive Terts and Treaty ProvisionsConcerning the L tilifation ofl nterinationalRivers
7
iAnia-ofo r Other Purpose than \avigation, ST LEG SER.B 12 (19 41 at 229 & 236. the Treatyrs
nan (,.opt'ration of 1978 created the Rhine and the Danube River Commission, reprinted in 17:5
I L \1 1)45. the 1964 Niamey Agreement created the Niger riscr Commission and the International
Joint Commission betsween the United States established according to the Boundary (ons ention of
Mlarch 1, 1889. For discussion of these treaties, see Dante A Caponera, "Patterns of Cooperation in
International Water Law: Principles and Institutions'" (I185) 25 Nat Resources J. 563 at 572-587;
Radosesich: Joint Institutional Management, supra note I SX at 262: Melanne A. Ciic, "A New
Conceptual Framework for Jordan Ri%cr Basin Management. A Proposal for a Trusteeship Commis,ion
(11998) 9 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 285 at 306-3 13. Godana: Africa's Shared Waters,
.upra note 2) at 250.
160 (odana \frica', Shared Waters. supra note 20 at 250.
161 Ibid
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of an institutional framework for the management and development of
international watercou-ses. It suggested that:
States sharing wxater resources ...should cooperate in the establishment
of programs, machinery. and institutions necessary for the coordinated
de elopment of such resources ...and establish joint committees ...to
provide tor the ...collection, standardization and exchange of data, the
management of shared \\ater resources. the prev ention and control of water
pollution, the prevention of \xater associated diseases, mitigation of
drouLht, flood control. river impro ement activities, and flood warning
,:
sstems.
The importance of an integrated and coordinated management of a shared
international watercourse is also underlined bv the ('onvention. Article 24( 1)
of the Convenntion provides that: 'Vatercourse States shall, at the request
of any of them, enter into consultations concerning the management of an
international watercourse. which rnay include the establishment of a
joint mana-enent inechani ,m."'L"i Article 24(2) defines the term
management as:
(a)

Planning the sustainable de\elopment of an international water
course and providing for the implementation of any plans adopted:
and
(b) Otherwise promoting the rational and optimal utilization, protection
and control of the \\ atercourse.
Experience has shown that a major problem in the development of an
international watercourse lies in the difficulty of establishing an institution that is charged with the management of the water resources."'" This is

because any such institution will ine itably invol\ e some restriction on
the political sovereignty of the \ arious states'" and the ability of those
states to make final decisions on important issues that they consider to
invol,,e issues of national sovereignty which are always jealously guarded.
States, therefore, tend to create institutions that have limited powers and
66
that encroach as little as possible on their authority.

162. Report of the United Nations \\ater Conference, Mar del Plata, Argentina, 14-25 March 1977,
U.\. Doc. E!CONF70 29.

163. C,,wvention, supra note 98, Art. 24( 1 [emphasis added]
164. Herbert Arthur Smith. The Economic Uves of International Rnicwr (London: P.S. King and
Sons Ltd., 1931) 120.

165. Dellapenna: Treaties as Instruments, supra note 6 at S4.
166. Menon: Institutional Mechanisms, supra note 157 at S 1
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Ne\ertheless, the institution should have the power to make binding
decisions in order to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement. In
the opinion of Tadros, the existing dispute settlement mechanisms for
international environmental issues leave much to be desired. 167 He
contends that the International Court of Justice, the institution that settles
such disputes, has neither the expertise nor the legal machinery to enforce
its decisions. "'He argues that the establishment of a discrete dispute settlement institution will provide three ad\antages:
First, the forum v\ ill deal solcly with the Nile basin states: therefore it can
gain the legitimac, and authority needed. Secondly, it wkill develop
e\pertise [o]n the issues of that region, and the international agreements
that gosern. Finally, because it is local and the states are parties to the
agreement, claims can be brought with expediency and decisions rendered
efficiently."'
The po\\ er and duties of the international watercourse institutional arrangement should be clearly specified, because they hake a bearing on how
those powers are exercised and ho\\ the institution is equipped and staffed.
It should be added that the authority of the institutional arrangement should
not be limited to data collection and research acti\ ities, as was the case in
the t1\dro Meteorological Survey of Lakes Victoria, Kioga and Albert
(HYDRO\IET), UNDUGUL' and the TECCONILE.F' The riparian states
\kill benefit from a strong institutional arrangement that is capable of
discharging the responsibilities entrusted to it. This institution should, therefore, be vested \,kith sufficient authorit\, as \ell as financial and human
resources.' 72 Such a transnational water resource management institution
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1701 NDUGU or \dugu in Swahili means Brotherhood. The U\DUGU Group as established in
1,)X1 consisting of si\of the Nile riparian state.,. namely Egypt. Sudan, Uganda. Zaire, Rwanda,
Burundi, and the Central Africa Republic. It skas later succeeded by the TECC ONILE See Robert O.
Collins. "The Inscrutable Nile at the Beginning of the Ne\ Millennium," online: Department of
Hi'tor. at the Unisertiiy of California, Santa Barbara - http: ,wv'.histor,.ucsb. edu, facuity
lnscrutablc",2iiNilel .pdf" at 5 (date accessed October 6. 20 4)
1"1. Caponera. Legal Aspects, ,iipraz note S at 001
172. Dellapenna: Treaties as Instruments. siprm note 6 at 54 Dellapenna claims that [n]ations have
found itvery difficult to agree to relinquish their so\ercignty to international institutions authorized
to plan. construct, or operate single or multi-purpose projects despite the considerable benefits to be
especied (rim such institutions." Ibid. Some water law experts, howeser, claim that the majority of
watcr rcsource management structures arc "rendered \scak or moperatisc. because of the huge political difficulties that are on their way." Sec for instance, Professor Thomas R. Odhiambo, "'Coordination ,tNile Basin-Wide Research Approaches" (Notes for a Kevnote Address on the first day of the
9' Nile 2002 Conference, Nairobi, Kenya. 7-9 October 2002) at 2.

The Nile Basin. From Confrontation to Cooperation

will also have a significant role to pool resources from multilateral and
bilateral donors. For instance, the new Operational Polices 7.50 of the World
Bank states that the Bank is ready to assist basin nations in achieving joint
cooperation and goodwill.'- According to one scholar, "[t]he existence of
sound institutional and legal frameworks for preventing and resolving water
use and management disputes among basin nations will facilitate the
process of executing these Bank instruments."" 4 In sum, establishment of
the institution indicates to donors and the international community the
existence of a basin-wide agreement and commitment of basin countries
to wvork together. "5
Another important issue is how the institution will be constituted. The
representatives of the riparian states in the current NBI are Ministers and
high-lex el govemient officials. This representation has a tendency to make
the negotiations politically charged and less sensitive to the important physical-economic aspects of the water resources involved. 7 6 It is strongly
suggested that the representatixes should be technical and legal experts
xith a professional background rather than political representatives.
Equal importance should be given to national institutions that are
responsible for water and related issues. The existence of national institutions that are well financed and properly staffed is a necessary prerequisite
to effective transnational cooperation.' Most of the Nile basin countries
lack a well-developed national legal and policy framework and properly
financed and staffed institutions that are capable of addressing water issues on both the domestic and international Ievel.
There is, therefore,
great need to boost the technical and legal capacities of national institutions. This will enable riparians to identify their interests and goals in the
short and long run and to take stock of the type and nature of the water

173. Okaru-Bisant: institutional and Legal Framework, supra note 80 at 333.
174. Ibid.
175. Kinfe Abraham, "Nile Imperatives: Avenues Toward A Win-Win Situation," online: EIIPD
<http: ,www.eiipd.orgiresearch/nile0 o20issue/nile-imperati es.htm#THE HISTORICAL> (date accessed: September 7, 2004).
176. Northcutt Ely & Abel Wolman, "Administration" in A.H. Garretson, R.D. Hayton & C.J.
Olmstead, eds., The Law ofInternational Drainage Basins (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc.,

1967) 124 at 138, [Ely and Wolman: Administration].
177. Okaru-Bisant: Institutional and Legal Framework, supra note 80 at 332.
178. See Carroll: Past and Future, supra note 20 at 292-297 for an excellent discussion on technical
and legal capacity of the Nile riparian states.
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rcSo1irccs that are avaIlable in the basin.'"" The process of discussion should
provide tile Nile states the opportunity to prioritize their interests and goals,
and c\en "a collective identity of the Nile states as basin states,"' " which
makes negotiation much easier.' According to Brunn&e andToope, "'.. the
emergence of a basin identity and shared understanding as to basin-wide
interests \%ill serve to constrain Nile states from making entirely self-interested arguments."' 2
As indicated above, the NBI is a transitional arrangement with limited
technical, financial and human resources. There is, therefore, a need to
develop "...the institutional setup from the present NILE COM and NILE
TAC to a more profound Nile Basin institutional legal cooperative framexxork capable of achiev ing economic integration in all development
economic sectors. " "" The permanent nature of the institution would
enable it "... to anticipate and adapt to the dynamic and changing aspects
of river development."'8 4 It would also enable the riparians to discuss
common issues on an uninterrupted basis without the need for negotiations at the diplomatic level each time a ne\N issue arises.

(Cnclu.si/
For many .Nears. the Nile riparian states. especially Ethiopia, Egypt and to
some extent the Sudan, remained eyeball-to-eyeball over the use of water
resources of the Nile. It now appears that the narrowly defined national
interests of the past have begun to give x\ay to a spirit of cooperation and

I9 Ihid at 297 The mecting con\ened h , the t N 'secretariat at Dakar in 19 1 recommended that
"multinational acti iticS in respcct of international \ atercour~es should be supported by appropriate
machinerx it the national level v.hich would act as a liai,on w.ith the international agencies and
coordinate and take account of the ,ariou, sectors in'olved at all le\ cis of administration... .United
Nations, Exletct t in tie Deiclopmen and lhaagcngi ent o Internalrea Rive'r and Lake Basins.
Prot ce/,,iit of ithe
t it"id \ations Inierregional Aleeling olInternational Rivcr Oiji.ani:atio , Dukal:
Sen, al, 5-14 ai 19,'I (Ne\k York: United Nations, 1981.
180 Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, "'TheChanging Nile Basin Regime: Does the Law Matter?"
200)2 Harv. Int'l L J 105 at 155 [Brunnee & Toope Does the Law Miatter?].
IXI Some author, claim that since a multilateral initilati\c addrc,,ing theconcernsofall ten riparians
of the Nile \Nill most likely not transpire. He suggested that a solid cooperation at the sub-basin
among t gvpt. "sudan. and Ethiopia, which hold within their territor' the largest portion of the river
flow and hasc the largest stakes in the conflict level, should take priorlt,. See Dagne: Towards a
Cooperative Use, Nupra note 110 at 236.
IX2 Brunnc & loope: )oes the I.i%, Matter., .suitpra note lx01 at I55.
183. Speech by the Honorable (Ctsi oI Honour the\ ice Prcident of the Republic of Sudan. On the
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'%ww. nilehiin.org/(ountry",,2OStatement ".,21i lhtnrn Burundi Statement (date accessed March 10,
20021) - (dte accc,ed: July 6. 211111
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good nc ghbourl incss. There are indications that the basin states arc
capable of \working jointl\ to alleviate the harsh effects of famine and
po\crt\ that ha\e become such a distinctive trademark of the region.
Recent developments provide some flicker of hope to the poverty-stricken
inhabitants of the basin. There is optimism that the measures that are being
taken will lay a solid foundation for an equitable and sustainable utilization of the Nile waters. After all. it is only \\ ith a unified and cooperati\ c
de\ elopment of the Nile that recogni/es the rights of all the riparian states
that the basin states \will be able to more efTecti%ely tackle the multifaceted
problems tacing the recion.
There is no doubt that formulating a mutually acceptable accord o\r a
scarce water resource shared by as manm as ten countries and in a region
that has been \ itness to political tensions and contro\crsies as the Nile
basin rna\ be an extremely complex and painstaking task. f o\xe er. if all
the riparians are \\illing and ready to address the problems fairly and with
the proper mindset. achie\inu a lasting solution to the Nile problems is not
impossible.
There is a long and perhaps bumpy road ahead for the riparian states
but, as the sa\ing goes. a long journeN begins with a single step. The
riparian states ha\e made a move in the right direction, but they need to
make man\ additional and determined strides to reach their destination.
The successful implementation of all the programs and projects requires
permanent legal. institutional and administrati\e arrangements. The
riparian states should hasten to support their highly encouraging achic\cments \with an institutional framewx ork that best addresses the particular
features of the basin and best serves the interests of the riparians. In this
regard, the international community should continue to provide much overdue support and backing to the riparian states in order to enable the riparians
to develop their legal. technical and institutional capacity on water resource
utilization and management. As David GreN stated:
[L]et not the histor\ books stop x, ith [the] deliberations and \,isions [of
the Nile countries]. Let histor, record how [the riparians] w\ork to take
the path of Nile Cooperation succeeded in playing its part in the realization
of the hopes and dreams of the \oung people of [the] countries
and of
their children and their grandchildren.'
And let the Nile, which many thought might bring war to the basin, serve as a
prime example of how a shared water resource can serve as a catalyst for
cooperation, development, stability, and even regional economic integration.
15 Grey: Opening Remarks. supra note 70

